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THE VIEW FROM MAIN STREET
STANLEY M. MORRIS'
"And do as adversaries do in law - strive mightily, but eat
and drink as friends."
Shakespeare, Taming of the Shrew, Act 1, Scene 2
The above quotation was once the hallmark of the profession
of lawyering. At the same time, it was one of the great enigmas
about the profession that confused the population at large; our
capacity to maintain respectful relationships with legal adver-
saries at the end of the day.1 To a large extent, that ability to
"eat and drink as friends" has been lost. My perception is that a
great sense of community was destroyed somewhere along the
way as lawyers ceased telling the truth to one another. Since I
have only practiced in Colorado, although for more than twenty-
seven years, most of my examples must, of necessity, be drawn
from Colorado sources.2 I do believe, however, that this is a na-
tional trend.3
The Author is an attorney in Cortez, Colorado. He received both his under-
graduate degree and law degree from Indiana University. He is admitted to the Bar
of Colorado and has been in private practice since 1973.
'See Brent E. Dickson & Julia Bunton Jackson, Renewing Lawyer Civility, 28
VAL. U. L. REv. 531 (1994) ("The capacity of lawyers to wage legal battle against
each other while treating the law and each other with courtesy and respect has long
intrigued the popular interest.")
2See, e.g., Brooke L. Wunnicke, From A Pioneer Woman Trial Lawyer, in Civil
Litigation in Colorado: A Look Back and A Look Around, 26 COLO. LAW. 115, 118
(Richard L. Gabriel ed.)(1997) (discussing the lack of civility among lawyers as a
cause of the decline in the standards of the legal profession, Brooke Wunnicke
states, "I have had judges tell me that counsel are not even civil to them .... [I]n
my day, a lawyer's word was better than a sealed undertaking. Too often, that is no
longer the case.").
'See John C. Buchanan, The Demise of Legal Professionalism: Accepting Re-
sponsibility and Implementing Change, 28 VAL. U. L. REV. 563, 568 (1994) (citing
lawyers' "flagrant disrespect" for one another in the courtroom as one of the reasons
they are to blame for the profession's general decline); see also Dickson & Jackson,
229
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Main Street is the heart of all corruption, if you believe Sin-
clair Lewis,' or the heart of America, if you believe Billy Gra-
ham.' Whatever your belief, it is here on Main Street that the
problem is most easily seen, as if through a prism. It is through
the morning window of the coffee shop on Main Street that the
"important people" of the town may be seen deciding the con-
cerns of our community for that day. It is here that the attitudes
of lawyers can be surveyed and gauged.
Most distressing is lawyers inability to speak the truth to
each other. This inability to engage in truth-telling manifests it-
self in our perceptions of our world, and in how we treat the
world at large. It is apparent in whether we have respect for the
circumstances of other parties and their attorneys in the court
room, respect for judges, for witnesses and for the public in gen-
eral. The problem is visible, in part, in acrimony among attor-
neys in and out of the courtroom. Debates by lawyers degener-
ate into ad-hominem attacks on each other. Other symptoms
run the gamut from deceptive billing practices' to confusing zeal-
ous representation of a client's cause with zealotry in the cause
itself.
7
supra note 1, at 541 (stating that the nationwide decline in lawyer civility is not ir-
reversible). Dickson and Jackson discuss the steps that many states, including Indi-
ana, Illinois, Wisconsin, Kansas and Delaware, are taking to deal with the problem
of lawyer incivility. See id. at 532-40.
4 See generally SINCLAIR LEWIS, MAIN STREET (Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc.
1920).
5 See Jim W. Jones, Graham Still Fills Spiritual Role for Nations, FT. WORTH
STAR-TELEGRAM, Apr. 30, 1995 at 8 (citing Billy Graham's statement that the Okla-
homa City bombing was a "senseless tragedy" that ripped "at the bare heart of
America"); Chet Lunner, Town Remembers Troops Killed in Scud Attack, GANNETT
NEWS SERV., Mar. 10, 1991 (discussing Billy Graham's statement that Greensburg,
Pennsylvania is the "heart of America").
a See Kenneth Lasson, Lawyering Askew: Excesses in the Pursuit of Fees and
Justice, 74 B. U. L. REV. 723, 748-49 (1994) (discussing two forms of deceptive bill-
ing practices, double billing and charging costs as fees); Lisa G. Lerman, Lying to
Clients, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 659, 716-17 (1990) (discussing a study done by the
author in which it was found that the most common deceptive billing practice among
lawyers interviewed was failure to keep good records of time spent working); Doug-
las R. Richmond, Professional Responsibility and the Bottom Line: The Ethics of
Billing, 20 S. ILL. U. L. J. 261, 263-64 (1996)("Fraudulent or deceptive billing is a
disturbingly common problem."). See generally William G. Ross, The Ethics of
Hourly Billing by Attorneys, 44 RUTGERS L. REV. 1, 15 (1991) (discussing various
lawyers' confessions of their deceptive billing practices).John Buchanan recounts an instance when lawyers from two large Manhattan
law firms were working on a case and began to fight about a trivial document, and
.suddenly three grown men in tailored suits were squirming around on the floor,
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In large part this trend has come to us, not because we saw
it coming, but because of the kinds of behavior we have dis-
played, the common responses to our methods of practice and the
rules that we impose upon ourselves. Several years ago, Colo-
rado, among other states, adopted a revised form of Rule 26 of
the Rules of Civil Procedure,8 governing the duty of disclosure
one party has to another during discovery. The revision provides
that certain documents must be disclosed even without a formal
request and sets out the limitations and procedures of discovery.9
This revised rule was adopted not out of a perceived defect in
existing procedures, but because of "the need to eliminate
gamesmanship and enhance professionalism. " "1
This change in emphasis from trust in the lawyer's profes-
sionalism to increasing technical requirements and compliance
with rules of disclosure is further illustrated by an increase in
Colorado in the mandatory continuing legal education require-
ment for ethics training from two hours to seven hours. This
requirement is quite a change for those who have been in the
practice longer than twenty years, when the subject of legal eth-
ics was not required at all, and was only casually addressed in
the law schools. Depressingly, it seems the more ethics is being
taught in schools, 2 the more lightly ethical violations are re-
garded.
For example, at one time on our particular Main Street,
there was an attorney, whom I will call "Jimmy," whose reputa-
tion was poorly regarded. The barber-shop talk was that if any-
one were in such deep difficulty that he needed a really crooked
lawyer, he should immediately hire Jimmy. Although Jimmy
was a bender of the rules when it came to ethics, he would re-
spond when items were put in writing and he did comply with
fists a flying." Buchanan, supra note 3, at 567 (quoting David A- Kaplan & Ginny
Carroll, How's Your Lawyer's Left Jab?, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 26, 1990, at 70).
'See COLO. REV. STAT. ch. 4, Rule 26 (1997)
See id.
t0 Knapp, 12 COLORADO PRACTICE, §26.2.2, at 69 (West 1996).
" See COLO. REV. STAT. ch. 20, Rule 260.2(2) (1997). This increase became ef-
fective on January 1, 1992. See id.
12 See Barry Sullivan, Professions of Law, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1235, 1268
(1996) (discussing the expanded ethics curriculum of many law schools today). But
see Bruce A. Green, Less Is More: Teaching Legal Ethics in Context, 39 Wm. & MARY
L. REV. 357, 367 (1998) (stating that many law schools devote only one or two cred-
its to ethics courses, and positing that even an increase to three or four credits
would be inadequate).
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court orders. The general opinion throughout the community
was that he knew the truth, but it was simply his choice to dis-
regard it. To my knowledge, he was not regarded as the norm.
Since Jimmy's passing, he has been replaced by an attorney
whom I will call "Daniel." Unlike Jimmy, Daniel does not appear
to recognize truth or reality. His attitude enables him to blandly
ignore court orders and deny the plain meaning of letters di-
rected to him. He is not an attorney who engages in the com-
monly-complained of problem of harassing the opposition with
paperwork; rather, this is a lawyer who files documents without
a whit of legal citation. He then insists in court on an interpre-
tation of the facts for which he was unable to provide support.
Lack of legal citation, unfortunately, is one of the disconnec-
tions from reality from which our profession suffers. Lawyers
will argue their position in pleadings utterly devoid of reliance
on any proposition of law or case holding. Since the law is the
framework upon which we hang our causes, these "lawless"
pleadings are like dealing with mush. As a result, Daniel and
his coterie appear to be free to assign whatever meaning they
wish to their assertions.
To be sure, lawyers have for centuries pressed home the
points that they wish to stress, but there was always an asser-
tion that the framework of the rules of the law led to the truth,"a
even where direct case support could not be provided. The gen-
eral population seems to believe, however, that this presentation
of the most favorable aspect of a lawyer's case is somehow a con-
cealment of fact."' Some of this perception is due to confusion
because of the function of the rules of evidence to ensure reliabil-
ity; at times, what would be regarded by the layperson as reli-
able enough to be heard, albeit with a grain of salt, is regarded
by the courts as too prejudicial or otherwise too unfair or unreli-
able to be considered. As the Colorado evidence rule notes,
"[tihese rules shall be construed to secure fairness in admini-
1' See FED. R. EID. 102 (stating that the purpose of the Federal Rules is to as-
certain the truth); 1 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 72, at 268-69 (John William Strong
et al. eds., 4th ed. 1992) (noting that the majority of the rules of evidence are justi-
fied by their tendency to promote the truth).
" See Bruce A. Green, "The Whole Truth?". How Rules of Evidence Make Law-
yers Deceitful, 25 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 699, 699 (1992)(The evidentiary rules promote
the appearance of deceit by restricting the introduction of evidence that jurors ex-
pect to receive; they promote actual deceit by legitimizing prevailing methods of
witness preparation that make testimony less truthful, rather than more truthful.").
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stration, elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay, and
promotion of growth and development of the law of evidence to
the end that the truth may be ascertained and proceedings justly
determined." 5
The public does not always understand the importance of
the insistence on heightened rules of reliability, and the refusal
to accept as evidence in a court of law what is "common knowl-
edge" without some foundation in fact. Daniel and other lawyers
like him seem to thrive on this disregard of the foundation of
fact. What they do not realize is that when arguments are put
forward without a sufficient basis in evidentially reliable facts,
they are essentially untruthful.
Acrimony is stirred up by reliance on inadequately sup-
ported facts. Daniel and his contemporaries have either forgot-
ten or never learned the axiom taught by Professor Karl Llewel-
lyn's The Bramble Bush." That adage is, that disputes are what
the law is about, "[a]nd the people who have the doing in charge,
whether they be judges or sheriffs or clerks or jailers or lawyers,
are officials of the law. What these officials do about disputes is,
to my mind, the law itself.""
Daniel does not seem to regard himself as an official of the
law. He does not deal with the law as if it concerned actual dis-
putes with real consequences to real people. Unfortunately,
Daniel is not an isolated case. There are too many lawyers who
could fit the following anecdote.
One of the most agonizing moments I have ever experienced
as a lawyer was when, by happenstance, I found myself in the
company of Daniel and several laypeople for a period of about an
hour during an automobile trip. Daniel was expounding on what
grand fun he was having practicing law. I held my peace as my
one contact with Daniel, at that point, had been a custody dis-
pute in which his actions had reduced my client to tears and sur-
render, due to the virulence of his attacks. Apparently recalling
our encounter, Daniel turned to me, slapped me on the leg, and
said, "We've had some fun, haven't we?" One of the other pas-
sengers saw my expression and, earning my gratitude, re-
sponded for me by saying, "No, he apparently just regarded it as
'6 COLO. REV. STAT. ch. 33, Rule 102 (1997).
16 KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH, ON OUR LAW AND ITS STUDY (3rd
ed. 1960).
" Id. at 3 (emphasis in the original).
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work."
A similar shudder was induced in me years ago by a young
police officer who commented, quite sincerely, that he believed
lawyers huddled with their clients to concoct their defense. It
has been my experience that the versions told by police wit-
nesses and defendants do not often vary by much; they do, how-
ever, vary in emphasis. It is these differing emphases that are
the heart of most disputes, not only in criminal cases but also in
civil cases. When lawyers forget that there are two sides to a
story and deal with their side as the exclusive truth, profes-
sionalism becomes lost and the dispute between the lawyers be-
comes unduly personalized. Lawyers seem to have forgotten
that we are advocates and not acolytes.
Returning to public perception, our impact on the commu-
nity at large is, unfortunately, expressed by Carl Sandburg's
poem, The Lawyers Know Too Much 8 :
The lawyers, Bob, know too much.
They are chums of the books of old John Marshall.
They know it all, what a dead hand wrote,
A stiff dead hand and its knuckles crumbling,
The bones of the fingers a thin white ash.
The lawyers know a dead man's thoughts too well.
In the heels of the higgling lawyers, Bob,
Too many slippery ifs and buts and howevers,
Too much hereinbefore provided whereas,
Too many doors to go in and out of.
When the lawyers are through
What is there left, Bob?
Can a mouse nibble at it
And find enough to fasten a tooth in?
I CARL SANDBURG, The Lawyers Know Too Much, in THE COMPLETE POEMS OF
CARL SANDBURG 189 (1970).
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Why is there always a secret singing
When a lawyer cashes in?
Why does a hearse horse snicker
Hauling a lawyer away?
The work of a bricklayer goes to the blue.
The knack of a mason outlasts a moon.
The hands of a plasterer hold a room together.
The land of a farmer wishes him back again.
Singers of songs and dreamers of plays
Build a house no wind blows over.
The lawyers--tell me why a hearse horse snickers hauling a
lawyer's bones.19
Rather than being an influence for good, lawyers have be-
come an einblem of grasping and petty bickering. However, as
officials of the law, we are to shape a dispute, not become part of
it.
Lawyers have come to be regarded as epitomized by
"lawyerspeak." Lawyerspeak is that peculiar language in which
only we lawyers converse.2 ' An illustration from the 1992 presi-
dential campaign provides a classic example. When Mr. Clinton
was asked if he had ever smoked marijuana, his first response
was to dissemble and defer.2 ' After some pushing and prodding,
he responded, "I have never broken the laws of my country."
21
When someone realized that Mr. Clinton had been a student in
England during part of his college career, Mr. Clinton provided
his famous (or infamous, depending on your politics) response, "I
didn't inhale."' A newspaper article some time later described
an MTV interview during which Clinton implied that he couldn't
19 Id.
20 See Mortimer Sellers, Think of Your Latin When Hurling Accusations, NArL
L. J., Feb. 9, 1998, at Alg ("Lawyers have earned a bad name for sophistry and ma-
nipulating language to mislead to unwary.").
" See Thomas B. Edeall, Clinton Admits '60s Marijuana Use, WASH. POST, Mar.
30, 1992, at Al(noting that "until today, Clinton essentially evaded the question").Id. (quoting a statement made by Clinton the previous week).
" Id. at As
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have inhaled, even if he had wanted to.' By that time, political
figures who had smoked marijuana in their youth were coming
out of the proverbial weed patch.' Of course, put the whole con-
troversy in perspective by pointing out that anyone who had
been in college or graduate school during the late 60's or early
70's had, in all probability, at least sampled marijuana.2" How
much better it would have been for our profession had Mr. Clin-
ton's first response been something like, "yes, I tried it, but I
gagged," and he had simply put the situation behind him.
This kind of dissembling is, I believe, a feature inherent in
the personality of, and considered an asset and a skill in, one
who becomes an active practicing lawyer. As lawyers, we seek to
inflate our status or downplay a fault. This trait is simply hu-
man. It was well defined by David Nyberg in his book, The Var-
nished Truth:
27
Any adequate explanation of deception must embody the one
law of human nature we can infer from the last century of psy-
chological theory; namely, that people need to think well of
themselves, and to do, so they need to be thought well of by
somebody else. Our common ground is a need to appear to be
better than we think we really are.U
Lamentably, this predisposition is magnified and fostered by
our profession. I believe that Daniel and other lawyers like him
take this beyond what was ever contemplated. This continual
evolution of "hide and seek" tactics in the day-to-day practice of
the law prompted an editorial by Richard S. Hennessey, a former
chair of the Colorado Supreme Court Grievance Committee and
member and former chair of the Colorado Bar Association Ethics
Committee. In his commentary, Hennessey wrote about the new
disclosure Rules as adopted, and in his editorial states:
I submit that these new disclosure rules were intended to force
24 See Maralee Schwartz & Howard Kurtz, Clinton Gets His MTV, Wants Its
Viewer' Votes: Network Invites Bush and Perot to Appear Too, WASH. POST, June 17,
1992, at A16 (quoting Clinton's response when asked if he could do it all over would
he inhale: 'Sure, if I could.").
See id. (listing Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas, then Senator Al
Gore, Jr., and former Governor of Arizona, Bruce Babbitt).
See Bob Greene, This Is Surrogate Parenthood, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB.,
Apr. 7, 1987 at B6 ("The prevalence of alcohol and drugs on campuses, which was
winked at by many university administrations in the '60's and '70's .... ").'
27 DAVID NYBERO, THE VARNISHED TRUTH, TRUTH TELLING AND DECEIVING IN
ORDINARY LIFE (1996).
2 Id. at 86.
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a shift from the prior order, which favored the advisory ethic, to
a new order, which emphasizes the lawyer's responsibilities, in
litigation, as an officer of the Court, in the Law Office, as a pri-
vate administrator of the law with public responsibility. This
shift expands the scopes of the lawyer's individual ethical re-
sponsibilities well beyond rationalizing lawyer conduct princi-
29pally as agent or representative.
Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia commented in a dis-
sent to the changes to Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure, addressing disclosure, that the rule changes, which were
made without adequate study and testing, would encourage
frivolous litigation, and were more about attitudes than anything
else.30 Writing in his editorial, Mr. Hennessey agrees, stating
that "Itihe clear direction has been away from basic principles to
be implemented in practice toward detailed proscriptive and pre-
scriptive rules. However, I believe, that in promoting more and
more rules, focus on our prime purpose of incorporating the
moral principle of justice has been lost."3 While agreeing with
the above, I further submit that what has been lost is the inter-
nalized sense of values that members of our profession once held
dear. Whether the loss has occurred within society as a whole,
or solely within the profession, these values must somehow be
regained. Mr. Hennessey correctly emphasized the attitudes of
lawyers. Professor Nyberg affirms:
Attorneys live in several societies: a small one with their clients
which is private and bounded by an ethic of confidentiality; a
larger one with their fellow attorneys and judges which includes
an ethic enjoining the 'kmowing' use of perjury: and the largest
one with the rest of us which, as we have seen, includes many
contradictory ethical positions on truth telling.2
Exactly how we navigate the fine line between truth and un-
truth can create problems in courtroom behavior. Professor
Monroe H. Freedman, in an article dealing with professional re-
sponsibility and the possibility of perjury, sets forth three ques-
"Richard F. Hennessey, Emphasizing Rules Instead of Principles Risks Losing
Our Sense of Purpose, 27 COLORADO LAWYER 2, 19 (Feb. 1998).
so See 61 U.S.L.W. 4365, 4393-94 (U.S. Apr. 27, 1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("a
measure which eliminates rather than strengthens a deterrent to frivolous litigation
is not what the times demand").
" Hennessey, supra note 29, at 20.
81 NYBERG, supra note 27, at 180.
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tions regarding possible perjury by a client or an impeachment of
a witness the attorney knows to be truthful."3 The second ques-
tion of Professor Freedman's article is the one that I find most
common. He asks, "[is it proper to put a witness on the stand
when you know he will commit perjury?'
A complainant in a workman's compensation case proves the
wrong date of the accident. The defendant insurance company's
counsel remains silent and moves to dismiss at the close of the
evidence. Although the crime was committed at 8:00 at night,
the District Attorney mistakenly proves it was committed at 9:00
p.m. The defendant's attorney knows his client has an alibi for
8:00 p.m. (although not for 9:00 p.m.), and presents his client's
testimony. Neither is perceived as lying. But these court room
strategies are regarded as just that. Each side of any controversy
has the task of presenting his most favorable case; many quite
reasonably take advantage of the flaws in the other side's pres-
entation, in hopes of securing a favorable outcome.
While attorneys have long engaged in the practice of selec-
tive truth telling, the practice has been balanced to some extent,
and therefore tolerated, by the fundamental idea of collegiality
outside the court room. The absence of collegiality has led to the
absence of truth-telling in relationships between attorneys. Al-
though collegiality can make life more pleasant, it sometimes re-
quires some uncomfortable truth-telling.
When I was a neophyte, I treasured advice from "older and
wiser heads." One such instance involved an experienced attor-
ney who brought to my attention an important legal issue I had
missed, even though he was my adversary in a dissolution of
marriage action. Together, we achieved a fair result and settled.
Monroe H. Freedman, Professional Responsibility of the Criminal Defense
Lawyer: The Three Hardest Questions, 64 MICH. L. REV. 1469 (1996). According to
Freedman, the three hardest questions are:
1. Is it proper to cross examine for the purpose of discrediting the reliabil-
ity or creditability of an adverse witness whom you know to be telling the
truth?
2. Is it proper to put a witness on the stand when you know he will commit
perjury?
3. It is proper to give your client legal advice when you have reason to be-
lieve that the knowledge you give him will tempt his to commit perjury?
Id.
Several judges, upon hearing of Professor Freedman's answers to the questions,
moved to have him disbarred.
84 Id.
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We spoke after final orders, and I thanked him for his courtesy.
He reminded me that he could have let me fall, but at some
point, after I became more experienced, he might overlook an es-
sential element, and he hoped for the same civility from me.
I do not believe Daniel has that same regard for his fellow
attorneys before the bar. Similarly, I am quite sure that other
attorneys find that he has little regard for truth-telling. Were he
an isolated case, he could be disregarded as an aberration. Un-
fortunately, too many lawyers, particularly those more newly
admitted to the profession, consider Daniel's methods to be
proper. It is not so much that Daniel cannot place the same
value on collegiality as do others. He apparently does not even
know that it exists as a characteristic for which to strive.
Daniel's failure to recognize the usefulness of collegiality
harms not only him but also his clients. Whether his motivation
is zealotry, or merely accumulation of wealth, his inability to
recognize the benefit of collegiality damages the profession as a
whole. Perhaps the increase in the number of lawyer jokes35 is a
reaction to this world constructed by Daniel and his colleagues,
since we most often make jokes about that which we fear.
Professor Llewellyn, in a chapter entitled "Before Sunrise"'
praises the inventions of lawyers, in order to offset Carl Sand-
burg's grim assessment. He praises the lawyers who devised
everything from "the long term lease for real estate improve-
ment, and the collateral trust for real estate financing,"37 to the
lawyers who changed opposition to the Government from treason
to merely losing an election.' Earlier in the book, in a chapter
entitled "Law in Civilization, " " Professor Llewellyn speaks ap-
provingly of our American society:
[but we know that for one reason or another, this learning
process is imperfect in some individuals; in some individuals,
various native desires, whether or not stirred by particular
chance contacts that we can trace, break through the accepted
a' See Michael A. Cardoza, In Our Own Image: A Chance to Improve the Profes-
sion, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 29, 1997, at 2 (describing how various rules regarding lawyer
civility can save the reputation the profession which "ranks among the bottom of
respected occupations." Now that "[l]awyers jokes are the staple of any comedic
repertoire").
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mold. While the child is in the home, this goes by the name of
naughtiness. When he gets out of the home it goes by the name
of badness, or queerness, and in due course delinquency--or
brilliance. When he becomes an adult we call it criminality on
the one hand and greatness on the other.40
On an initial reading, this assertion might strike one as pe-
culiar. Upon reflection, however, it seems that Professor
Llewellyn has put his finger on the genius of our legal system, so
different from European civil law or the British class system.
Unfortunately, without the internalization of important values
and recognition of his obligation to society, Daniel perverts the
genius of our legal system. The general public believes that,
without advocates of the law working within the law, society will
be governed without a necessary level of guidance. If this trend
continues, there will be little to call the potential delinquent
back from the edge of criminality and instead channel his non-
conformity into brilliance.
40 Id. at 129-30.
